Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis: Irrational Justice, Needless Delays, Excessive Costs by Civiletti, Benjamin R.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 1 Article 5
Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis: Irrational
Justice, Needless Delays, Excessive Costs
Benjamin R. Civiletti
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Benjamin R. Civiletti, Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis: Irrational Justice, Needless Delays, Excessive Costs, 46 Md. L. Rev. 40 (1986)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol46/iss1/5
COMMENTS ON GALANTER
ZEROING IN ON THE REAL LITIGATION CRISIS:
IRRATIONAL JUSTICE, NEEDLESS DELAYS,
EXCESSIVE COSTS
BENJAMIN R. CIVILETrI*
A fundamental goal of our civil justice system should be to as-
sure that legitimate claimants with serious injuries caused by wrong-
doing receive fair and just compensation for their injuries in a timely
and cost-efficient manner. The real crisis facing the civil justice sys-
tem cannot be seen as Professor Galanter suggests through the ap-
plication of statistical paradigms, but instead can be seen in the
failure of the system to achieve this fundamental goal. The real cri-
sis can be seen in the irrational justice dispensed by the civil justice
system, in the inordinate delays in courts across the country, and in
the wasteful costs imposed on those who are caught up in tort litiga-
tion. The real crisis can be seen from the fact that injured parties
carry the burden of their injury under appalling circumstances for
extreme periods of time and at staggering economic and human
costs.
Today innocent or near blameless defendants are too fre-
quently put at the mercy of happenstance and the vagaries and pas-
sions of the jurors. The aberrations that plague current tort
litigation not only disappoint the parties involved, but also impose a
tremendous, unpredictable, and unnecessary cost on litigants and
nonlitigants alike. The solution to the real litigation crisis lies in
fundamental tort reform coupled with measures designed to more
effectively and efficiently process the legitimate claims of injured
parties.
I. THE NEED TO RETURN TO FAULT-BASED LIABLITY
Historically, tort law had two purposes. Its first purpose was to
provide timely and reasonable compensation to those wrongfully in-
jured by others. Its second purpose was to deter such wrongful con-
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duct. Now, sadly, the tort system is serving neither of its original
purposes well.
Originally liability under tort law was based on fault. People
were only held liable for the injury of others when their conduct
affirmatively resulted in injury to others. As Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes explained in his classic work, The Common Law, tort law is
based on the premise that a person should be given "a fair chance to
avoid doing the harm before he is held responsible for it."' A
number of new doctrines have arisen that now threaten to erode
completely the concept of fault.
Strict liability, originally reserved for extraordinarily dangerous
circumstances, has been expanded to an almost absurd reach. Many
experts feel that this expansion of liability has led, certainly in the
products liability area, to an increase in tort litigation. Professor
Galanter's analysis indicates that it certainly has led to an increase in
products liability filings in federal courts2 and that such increases
have pressed on an already overburdened and malfunctioning sys-
tem. If the tort system is to function as was intended, liability
should be applied as was intended. Fault-based liability should be
restored. Strict liability should be limited to its original purpose-
extraordinarily dangerous circumstances.
The doctrine of joint and several liability, as applied in recent
years in many states, has also led to a distension of liability. Under
this doctrine, when two or more defendants have caused injury to a
single plaintiff, the entire liability can be imposed on one defendant.
Each is liable separately and together for the plaintiff's damages.
Too often this concept is abused and the plaintiff will seek redress
against only the most solvent defendant-the one said to have the
"deepest pocket" rather than the one most at fault. The plaintiff
can receive the entire award from the one defendant regardless of
1. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 115 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
2. Professor Galanter's statistics show a 46% increase in tort filings in federal dis-
trict courts from 1975 to 1984. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L.
REV. 3, 16, Table 2 (1986). Galanter further states that a major part of the increase in
tort case filings in federal courts was products liability cases. Id. at 21.
Although I would prefer to focus on state court litigation patterns, Professor Ga-
lanter chose to emphasize federal court filings and so I must respond in kind. I would
note, and Galanter initially concedes, the limited legitimacy of working with federal case-
load and disposition patterns. Galanter acknowledges that only 2% of all cases are filed
in federal courts. Regardless of that acknowledgement, however, he centers his argu-
ment around that group of cases.
Federal litigation represents so small a fraction of American litigation as to lack any
representativeness. Even though such data may be more readily available, they do not
necessarily present a true picture of the litigation situation in this country.
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that defendant's degree of fault or the plaintiff's contributory
negligence.
The doctrine of comparative negligence in its current applica-
tion has also invaded fault-based liability standards. Originally lia-
bility was measured under a contributory negligence standard by
which a plaintiff negligent in any but a very minor degree could not
recover against any defendant. This doctrine was fundamentally un-
fair and has been replaced with comparative negligence in all but six
states.3 Under pure comparative negligence, plaintiff's damages are
reduced proportionally for the plaintiff's own negligence but no de-
gree of negligence bars recovery from a defendant. Thus, for exam-
ple, a plaintiff eighty percent negligent could recover against parties
who were only twenty percent negligent.4
Fundamental reforms in joint and several liability and in com-
parative negligence standards could achieve more appropriate ap-
portioning of liability. Two reforms that are finding increasing
acceptance are pure several liability and a modified comparative
negligence standard of fault.
Pure several liability guarantees that individuals are held re-
sponsible only for their own actions, and not the actions of others.'
Wealthy defendants no longer act as insurers for the wrongdoing of
parties of lesser financial means.
3. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.1 (2d ed. 1986).
4. In the simple case, when the defendant has suffered no injuries, the plaintiff re-
covers 20% of the damages. When both have suffered injuries, a 20% negligent defend-
ant may counterclaim for 80% of the injuries. Even in this situation, it may be
economical for an 80% negligent plaintiff, with $100,000 in damages, to recover
$20,000 from the defendant. If the defendant has suffered only $10,000 in damages, the
defendant would recover $8,000 from the plaintiff, resulting in a net payment of
$12,000 to a plaintiff who was 80% at fault.
5. Twenty of the twenty-eight states that have adopted modified comparative negli-
gence have used the aggregate defendant comparison. This approach contrasts the
plaintiff's negligence with the total of all of the defendants' negligence, rather than with
the negligence of each individual defendant. See Riddel v. Little, 253 Ark. 686, 488
S.W.2d 34 (1972); Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962); Mountain Mo-
bile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h
(West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp. 1984); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 663-31(a) (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4 (Bums Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 668.3(1) (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(a) (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141(1) (Michie 1986); Hur-
ley v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 123 N.H. 750, 465 A.2d 1217 (1983); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1986); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(1) (Anderson
1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470
(1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1986); Jensen v. Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036
(Supp. 1986); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879
(1979).
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Under most modified comparative negligence systems, plaintiffs
can only recover when their negligence is less than the aggregate of
all the defendants' negligence.6 This assures that parties who have
primarily caused their own injuries cannot seek damages from those
less at fault.7 Under pure several liability incorporating a compara-
tive negligence standard, a defendant can be held liable only for that
portion of the judgment attributable to the defendant's own negli-
gence. Joint and several liability will still apply when it can be
shown that the defendants actually acted together and in concert to
cause the plaintiff's injury.8 However, the defendant must be al-
lowed to seek contribution from fellow tortfeasors.
Essential to both pure several liability and modified compara-
tive negligence is an assessment of the negligence of nonparties.
One cannot properly ascertain a defendant's fault, whether for com-
parison or determining the extent of liability, if ajury is not allowed
to consider the negligence of those not named in the suit. This re-
form is rapidly gaining acceptance among the state legislatures.9
II. RATIONALIZING DAMAGE AWARDS
Needed guidelines are missing. Currently, our legal system
provides judges and juries no rational basis for awarding
6. A comparative negligence system must also consider other factors. No compari-
son of fault should be made when a plaintiff has been injured as a result of a defendant's
intentional tort. Additionally, a comparative negligence system should not upset a
state's system of imputed negligence. If a state had imputed one party's negligence to
another, it should continue to do so for the purposes of comparing fault. Finally, as-
sumption of the risk should only act as a complete bar to recovery when the plaintiff has
expressly assumed the risk. Implied assumption of the risk in other cases should be only
one factor among others in assessing degrees of fault. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2505(A) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1763 (1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-572h (West Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1985); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 1411 (McK. 1976).
7. Joint liability for tortfeasors who act in concert traces back to the early common
law when it was considered impossible to divide what was seen as an indivisible wrong.
3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1 (2d ed. 1986). This joint
liability was included, as an exception to strict several liability, in the State of Washing-
ton's recent tort reform legislation. See An Act Relating to Civil Actions (Senate Bill No.
4630), ch. 305, § 401, 1986 Wash. Legis. Serv. No. 6, p. 47 (West).
8. Pure several liability should in no way upset vicarious liability. For example, an
employer would be responsible for its servant's portion of damages as well as its own,
but not for any other party's.
9. Provisions for the assessment of the fault of nonparties were included in recent
tort reform in Colorado: Act of May 16, 1986 (Senate Bill No. 70), ch. 108, 1986 Sess.
Laws 680; Connecticut: An Act Concerning Tort Reform, Public Act No. 86-338, § 3(d),
1986 Conn. Legis. Serv. No. 5, p. 399 (West); Washington: see supra note 7; Wyoming:
WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109(b) (Supp. 1986).
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noneconomic damages to injured parties. The amount of awards
for pain and suffering, rather than reflecting compensation for phys-
ical, mental, and emotional stress, too often reflect the passions of
the jury or the disproportionate skills of counsel.
Yet a means exists to create the guidelines. Legislatures are
uniquely capable of weighing the relative merits of competing issues
and the costs to society of uncontrolled noneconomic damages
awards. Pain and suffering awards should be capped by law at spe-
cific ceilings. Alternatively, legislative standards for compensation
should be established, such as basing the noneconomic damages
award on a set percentage of the award of economic damages.'"
A similar problem exists with regard to the award of punitive
damages. These awards serve an important deterrent function.
Under the present system, however, there is potential for abuse in
such awards. In most states, there are no limitations on the amount
of punitive damage awards or the number of times they may be as-
sessed against a particular defendant. Though such damage awards
are intended to punish the defendant and deter further wrongful
conduct rather than compensate the victim, punitive damage claims
are routinely inflated to a point incommensurate with punishment
for intentional wrongdoing. Punitive damages thus become just an-
other category whereby the plaintiff can be further enriched. The
jury is left to speculate, and the amount awarded is unpredictable.
In some cases the punitive damages award is wildly out of propor-
tion to the entire cause of action. Limits or restrictions should be
considered for the assessment or amount of punitive damage awards
and on the payment of such damages to a plaintiff.
Providing rational guidelines for damage awards is an impor-
tant element in solving the current litigation crisis. To truly allevi-
ate the crisis, however, tort reform must be coupled with efforts to
reduce delay and litigation costs.
III. ELIMINATING UNNECESSARY AND UNREASONABLE DELAY IN
RESOLVING CLAIMS
No rational person can justify the incredible delays seen in this
country's courts. The court system penalizes plaintiffs by forcing
them, in order to receive timely compensation, to settle for less than
the economic costs of their injuries. Further, these defendants are
10. Economic damages reimburse the injured party for medical expenses, costs of
repair or replacement of property, loss of earnings or income, and other objectively
verifiable monetary losses.
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penalized by being forced to pay the high transaction costs associ-
ated with delay. In the nation's largest trial court, litigants must
wait four years between filing and final disposition of their cases.l"
Perhaps this is an extreme example, but such "horror stories" serve
to alert us to problems.
Recently, the National Center for State Courts studied 18 state
general jurisdiction trial courts located in urban or metropolitan ar-
eas across the country.' 2 The focus was on tort disposition time,
that is, the time from filing of a claim to its final disposition. In the
slowest court, the median tort disposition time was 721 days.' 3
Only 51% of the cases were resolved in less than 2 years and 10% of
the cases took over 1,750 days or 4 years.' 4 Even in the fastest court
the median tort disposition time was 317 days.' 5 In that same court,
10% of the tort cases took over 654 days, and 6% took over 2
years. 1 6
The research showed little relationship between court size and
case processing time' 7 and virtually no relationship between the
utilization of jury trials and case processing time.' 8 Delay was not,
however, determined to be inevitable. The National Center study
showed that when the court accepts responsibility for the pace of
litigation and when scheduling and continuance policies make it
clear that the court has the capacity to hold trials at the time sched-
uled, the system can be more efficient and effective. It is also clear
that additional resources should be made available to the courts
when necessary.
An example makes the point vividly. Phoenix, Arizona, the
court with the shortest tort disposition time, has the most compre-
hensive civil case management system of any of the jurisdictions
studied.' 9 What began there as an experiment in civil delay reduc-
tion developed into a court-wide system aimed at reducing total civil
11. The average period to resolve claims in Los Angeles County is over four years.
Telephone interview with Steve Carroll, Deputy Director of the Rand Corporation Insti-
tute for Civil Justice (May 1986).
12. B. MAHONEY, L. SIPES &J. ITO, IMPLEMENTING DELAY REDUCTION AND DELAY PRE-
VENTION PROGRAMS IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (National Center for State Courts, 1985).




17. The courts with the fastest median case processing times had 59, 31, and 11
judges. Id. at 13, Table 11.7.
18. Id. at 14, Table I.10.
19. Id. at 26.
1986]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
case processing times to a maximum of fourteen months from filing.
The impact of management reforms is clear.
In Phoenix, each case is assigned to a particular judge who is
responsible for all aspects of the case from filing until the case is
concluded.20 Discovery must be completed within nine months of
filing and a firm trial date is set within ninety days of the certified
completion of discovery. 2' Requests for continuances must be
made in advance with reasons given. The presiding judge scruti-
nizes those reasons and though initial continuances are not uncom-
mon, second continuances are rare.22 Pro tem judges and permanent
judges who do not have a trial in progress on a particular day form a
pool of "back-ups" to ensure that the court can hold trial on the
date scheduled.23 Information on the program is widely circulated
and statistics on the program's success are collected regularly.24
To further facilitate dispute settlement, courts could lighten
their caseload by requiring alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for
appropriate cases. ADR can remove from the courts a significant
volume of cases not requiring formal judicial declarations. Used as
a substitute for litigation or as an alternative to trial after discovery
is completed, it would lessen the strain on existing judicial re-
sources. Arbitration, mediation, mini-trials, and pretrial hearings to
assist parties in reaching resolutions "can be useful components of
an overall delay reduction or prevention effort."'25 These methods
can be used regularly and have been used successfully in tort litiga-
tion without deprivation of the right to a full trial by jury. The ear-
lier a case can reach settlement, the less judicial resources are
wasted and the more efficiently the judicial system can address the
problems really requiring its attention.
IV. REDUCING LITIGATION COSTS
The costs incurred under the present system must, by anyone's
standards, be termed excessive. One of the primary costs can be
20. Id.
21. Id. at 25-26.
22. Id. at 26.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 19.
I would concur with the findings of MAHONEY, SIPES & ITO, id., that Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution programs will not be a "quick fix" for the current delay problems. Such
alternatives to conventional litigation can improve a jurisdiction's overall dispute resolu-
tion capacity, but the mere existence of such programs is not, in itself, a cure-all for
remedying the problems of backlog and delay.
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attributed to the expenses of obtaining legal counsel. For example,
in asbestos litigation, 61-63 % of every dollar paid out by defendants
and their insurers goes for transaction costs-attorney's fees and lit-
igation expenses.2 6 After the cost of counsel, one still must consider
the cost of processing the cases. The government expenditure,
alone, for a jury trial in a federal district court was recently esti-
mated at $10,466.27
Though 80-95% of the cases filed in federal district court are
settled before trial, the average expense per case filed is still approx-
imately $1,740.28 The judicial expansion of liability without regard
to fault, the threat of monumental awards, and the inordinate delays
clearly provide incentives to settle. Unfortunately, this may lead to
the filing of more and more frivolous suits in hopes of a settlement.
As settlements become more probable, it is likely, absent some con-
trols, that more frivolous suits will be filed; and thus the cycle con-
tinues. The continual filing and settling of such cases unnecessarily
wastes our limited judicial resources, delays or impedes the trial or
disposition of all other legitimate cases, and adds to the costs.
Meaningful sanctions against lawyers for undue delay or filing
frivolous suits or motions are now available in the federal rules and
in some state court rules. They should be imposed rigorously. Such
sanctions would discourage protracted litigation in an effort to wear
down the opponent. They would also provide an appropriate incen-
tive to settle when, after a case is filed, it becomes apparent that
further prosecution will be fruitless.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Galanter in his article identifies many of the impor-
tant purposes of tort litigation, including reformation, deterrence,
and compensation for wrongful injuries. Unfortunately, there is lit-
tle more than a random chance that these purposes will be fully
26. REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POL-
ICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY
44 (Feb. 1986).
Of every dollar paid out by asbestos manufactuers and those who insure them in a
tried asbestos case, only 37q represents net compensation to the victim. Defense legal
fees and expenses take 334 and the remaining 304 goes for plaintiff's legal fees and
expenses. There is only a slight difference in allocation when the case is settled rather
than tried to a conclusion. Net compensation to the victim is 394. Legal fees and ex-
penses for the defense account for 37q and only 254 is expended in plaintiff legal fees
and expenses. Id.
27. J. KAKALIK & R. Ross, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 41 (1983) (estimate
assumes one hearing and two conferences during jury trial).
28. Id. at 70.
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served by the current system. That is the real crisis facing us today.
Reforms must be made. If public expression is a reliable indication
of public impression and estimations of justice, as Professor Ga-
lanter suggests, then the general public has recognized the need for
immediate tort reform. Legislatures across the country are taking
action to restructure the civil justice system. 29
The delay and cost involved in the tort litigation system, in
themselves, supply ample justification for civil justice reforms even
without a "statistical" litigation explosion. Reforms are needed to
assure reasonable, timely compensation, to preserve access to the
courts for injured parties, and to discourage wrongful conduct. In
other words, a system is needed that does not outrage our common
sense notions ofjustice. Regardless of whether or not an increased
number of persons seek vindication of their claims in this nation's
courts, those who do look to the courts must find there a fair, effi-
cient, and predictable forum.
29. See Forty Legislatures Act to Readjust Liability Rules, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986, at 1,
col. 1. According to this article, just since the beginning of 1986 eight states have modi-
fied or abolished existing joint and several liability laws and twelve states have placed
limits on the amount a plaintiff can be awarded for pain and suffering. Other states have
placed broad limits on all noneconomic damages or intangible losses. Some states have
even placed ceilings on settlement amounts. Curbs have also been placed on lawyers'
fee arrangements-particularly contingency fee arrangements.
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